LIDS-SSRC Seminar: On the Consequences of Information in the First-Price Auction
April 7, 2015 | 4:00 pm | 32-155

Dirk_photoIn this presentation, Prof. Dirk Bergemann discussed how the structure of information can affect welfare outcomes in the first-price auction. For a given distribution of buyers’ valuations, he characterized all Bayesian equilibria that can arise under any specifications of the bidders’ higher-order beliefs as long as those beliefs are consistent with the common prior distribution of valuations. He derived tight lower and upper bounds on the revenue and the bidder surplus for symmetric and arbitrarily correlated distributions of values with any number of bidders. These results are used to study how entry fees and reserve prices impact the welfare bounds.

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